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A Critique of Precision Poverty Alleviation: Does China Approach 
Adequate Policy Tools? 
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Abstract 
China has achieved laudable progress in poverty reduction since its reform and opening in 1978 Its current precision 
poverty alleviation program may however encounter challenges and possibly even fail, if the intrinsic weaknesses in its 
design and difficulties in its implementation re not addressed soon enough. It is pointed out that perfect targeting is not 
impossible, personalized interventions will not solve structural problems and rapid interventions have little effects on 
chronic poverty or poverty trap. It is argued that extreme poverty in China cannot be eradicated once and for all by the 
end of 2020. As with many great goals, time overrun may occur. Some effective countermeasures must be in place to 
fend off the unfavorable consequences of that policy and to prevent the poor people from getting worse after 2020. 
 
1. Introduction 
Poverty as a mass phenomenon has been with us as long 
as the mankind itself. It most abundantly manifested itself 
with the emergence of early capitalism. Even the most ad-
vanced capitalism of the early 21c. has not been able to 
eliminate and/or eradicate it.  Poverty has been and may 
remain with us for quite some time, in various forms and 
degrees. Organized interventions have been introduced at 
large scale since early sixteen century (Geremek, 1994). 
However, most of these interventions failed to achieve the 
expected results. One of the more dramatic examples of 
these interventions is the War on Poverty launched in the 
mid-1960s, in the United States.  
 In the 50 years since that time, U.S. taxpayers have 
spent over $22 trillion1 on anti-poverty programs. Adjust-
ed for inflation, this spending (which does not include 
Social Security or Medicare) is three times the cost of all 
U.S. military wars since the American Revolution. Yet 
progress against poverty, as measured by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, has been minimal, and in terms of President 
Johnson’s main goal of reducing the “causes” rather than 
the mere “consequences” of poverty, the War on Poverty 
has failed completely. In fact, a significant portion of the 
population is now less capable of self-sufficiency than it 
was when the War on Poverty began. (Rec-
tor,Sheffield,2014) 
According to the statistics given by Rector and Sheffield, 
although the failure of the United States in the War on 
Poverty might well be exaggerated considering the real 
living conditions of the poor in the United States, and de-
spite of the problematic methods used by the U.S. Census 
Bureau in counting the poor, there were indeed a non-
ignorable number of Americans who did still live in abject 
poverty by 2014 2(Rector, Sheffield, 2014). Wealthy and 
                                                             
1  This is over $ 440 billion per year on average. Considering the 
war on poverty was brought to an end in the 1970s, we can have 
an idea about the intensity of financial investment in that pro-
gram.  
2  In 2014, the official poverty rate in the U.S. is about 14%, and 1 
in 70 of the officially poor is homeless at any given point during 
the year, and 4 percent of the officially poor are temporarily 
homeless during the year. 
highly developed as the United States is, it is still not capa-
ble of eradicating extreme poverty after a half century long 
bitter war against it. It is fairly safe to foretell the bleak 
prospects of most other battles aimed at eradicating pov-
erty in other countries. However, there is one large-scale 
poverty intervention worthy of our close examination, the 
one that has been implemented in China since 2014 and is 
about to finish by 2020. 
Having made spectacular progress in reducing absolute 
poverty since its economic reform dated back to 1978, Chi-
na’s achievement in poverty reduction has been generally 
well-received by the international community. China is 
regarded to have set an example for developing countries 
which are still wrestling with poverty. As Jefferson noticed 
in his e-primer Poverty: A Very Short Introduction: “In 
1981, China’s poverty rate was 88.3 per cent based on the 
headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP$). In 2010, this 
poverty rate was 11.2 per cent. This remarkable accom-
plishment was due in large part to rapid economic growth 
over this period. Thirty years of economic growth lifted 
over 700 million people out of extreme poverty in China” 
(Jefferson, 2018, p.103). 
Chandy was also very impressed by China’s achieve-
ment, “What the world achieved in the space of 200 years—
the reversal from fewer than one in five people living above 
$1.25 to fewer than one in five living below that threshold—
China managed in little more than twenty years” (Chandy, 
2015). 
While the key contributing factor to China’s achieve-
ment is its continuous rapid economic growth since the 
reform and opening, China’s success in poverty reduction 
may partially be attributed to the geographically targeted 
poverty reduction program first introduced in 1986, when 
331 counties were identified as the key targets in the na-
tional development-oriented poverty-reduction programs 
(Zhang et al, 2003). In 2001, with the decrease of the rural 
poor, it was judged that the county was no longer the ap-
propriate targeting unit; thereafter, the village took the 
place of the county as the basic unit of targeting, making 
the targeting more precise.  
When General Secretary Xi took his office in 2014, al-
most all the available data indicated that the targeted pov-
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success. As an ambitious politician, Xi decided to go one 
step further to eradicate the absolute poverty in China 
completely by enforcing a radical form of targeted poverty 
reduction program, the so-called Precision Poverty Allevia-
tion Program (PPA), in which the individual household or 
person is the targeting unit. In terms of the degree of preci-
sion, this program is undoubtedly the final version of pov-
erty targeting. However, is this radical policy a brilliant 
move or just a trillion RMB blunder? There are different 
opinions. While most domestic institutions and academics 
in China seem to believe that Xi’s policy drive to eradicate 
absolute poverty by 2020 is likely to succeed considering 
its heavy political and financial capital investment, there 
are many different voices, especially from outside China. 
For example, Taha Kehar expressed his skepticism about 
the prospect of China’s current poverty eradication policy.  
China’s President has set 2020 as the deadline to iron 
out the challenges posed by poverty in the country. It is 
part of the country’s centennial goals and eight main 
strategies have been adopted to put poverty alleviation 
into effect. Most of these measures are, at best, idealistic 
and there is a strong likelihood that they will not reap the 
desired results. (Kehar, 2018)  
However, Kehar’s attacks focus mainly on the technical 
aspects of the measures that China plans to take to fight 
poverty; it seems for him that China might be able to 
achieve its goal if it could take correct measures. While the 
deadline to eradicate the poverty in China is coming near, 
can Xi achieve his goal to make China the first major coun-
try free of extreme poverty? Although the answer may seem 
quite clear for most serious development economists, we 
need to work out solid reasoning to show why the newest 
and ultimate version of targeted poverty reduction program 
will not work in spite of China’s so many years of successful 
experiences and unprecedented commitment from the top. 
If PPA fails to achieve its goal at last, what are the implica-
tions of this failure theoretically and practically? What shall 
we do to neutralize the negative effects of PPA’s failure? We 
will tackle these problems from both the theoretical side 
and the practical side; but before we conduct our analysis, 
we need to take a close look at the various configurations of 
this precision poverty eradication program.  
2. The Basics of China’s Poverty Reduction 
Program 
China’s current poverty reduction program is termed in 
Mandarin as “Jingzhun Fu Pin (精准扶贫)”, which means 
literally “Precision Poverty Aid3”. PPA was used publicly 
first by Xi in 2013 and it took shape as the umbrella term 
for the national poverty reduction strategy including a se-
ries of poverty reduction policies in China from 2015 on. 
                                                             
3  In the newspapers, magazines and academic literatures, we can 
see different wordings for this targeted poverty intervention 
policy, such as “targeted poverty alleviation”, “precision poverty 
relief”, and “precision poverty alleviation” among others. It 
seems Chinese official media such as China Global Television 
Network prefers to use the term “precision poverty alleviation”, 
which can also be shortened to PPA. 
PPA is very special because it has many outstanding fea-
tures. 
▪ All the absolutely poor people in China will be identified 
and their information will be registered in a database (Pov-
erty-Household Registry), and not a single impoverished 
person would be forgotten. This requirement defines the 
scale of the program. When PPA was launched in 2014, 
over 89.6 million impoverished people were registered. 
▪ Poverty reduction resources will be targeted precisely to 
those who are officially identified as the poor and whose 
information is registered into the database. While the total 
sum of money put into poverty reduction has been in-
creased sharply since 2015, some old poverty reduction 
programs which were thought not consistent with PPA 
were ended. 
▪ The measures to be taken to help each impoverished per-
son (or household) to graduate from poverty would be cus-
tomized or personalized according to the specific situation 
of that person (or household). PPA is a comprehensive 
program including a series of measures which can be used 
to help the poor to escape poverty. At the national level, 8 
categories of measures have been devised, including devel-
oping industries such as tourism or e-commerce, to help 
villagers find a job or sell their products to larger markets 
after occupational training. People who live in geologically 
hazardous areas prone to earthquakes or landslides, or are 
based in remote areas, will be relocated. The elderly and 
infirm are entitled to get social security payments. 
▪ The responsibilities of the people who are assigned to 
help some poor to graduate from poverty and the account-
ing procedures are precisely defined. To realize the goal, 
China has established a 5-level responsibility pattern that 
covers provinces, cities, counties, townships and villages.  
▪ The commitment from the top leadership to PPA is ex-
tremely high. In 2017, Xi made the following remark on 
behalf of the newly elected top leadership of the Com-
munist Party of China (CPC): “In 2020, we will establish a 
moderately prosperous society across all metrics. This is 
the society to be enjoyed by each and every one of us. On 
the march towards common prosperity, no one must be left 
behind. We will mobilize the whole Party and the whole 
country in a resolute push to deliver on our pledge and 
eradicate poverty in China”4. In his 2018 New Year speech, 
Xi vowed again to all the Chinese people “It is our solemn 
commitment to lift all rural residents living below the cur-
rent poverty line out of poverty by 2020. Once made, a 
promise is as weighty as a thousand ounces of gold”5. The 
intensity of the support is unprecedented in terms of both 
money and people. With regard to financial investment, in 
2016, the special funds for poverty alleviation allocated by 
the central and local governments exceeded 100 billion 
RMB for the first time, including 66.7 billion RMB from the 
central government, an increase of 43.4% year on year and 
                                                             
4  The full text of this speech is accessible at 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/30516a4d32597a6333566d54/sh
are_p.html, retrieved on 12th February, 2019. 
5  The full text of this speech is accessible at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-
12/31/content_50181054.htm, retrieved on 12th February, 2019. 
A Critique of Precision Poverty Alleviation: Does China Approach Adequate Policy Tools? 
 
 
13 © Business and Public Administration Studies, 2020,Vol. 13, No. 1 
49.3 billion RMB from local governments, a year-on-year 
rise of 56.1%. The central government requires that there 
should be a resident task force in every poor village and 
person-in-charge for every poor household to achieve full 
coverage. China has dispatched a total of 775,000 officials 
to station in villages for a period of 1 to 3 years. The Organ-
ization Department of the CPC Central Committee has car-
ried out Party building to promote poverty alleviation by 
dispatching 188,000 officials to serve as “the first secre-
tary” in poor villages and villages with weak and lax grass-
roots Party organizations. The government has also moti-
vated businesses, individuals, NGOs and even the military 
to carry out PPA relief plans. Wealthier provinces are being 
designated one or several less-developed provinces for 
special guidance and assistance. (Tan, 2018). 
▪ All those officially identified as poor and got registered in 
the database will be lifted from poverty by 2020 and the 
absolute poverty will be eradicated in China by then. 
The first and foremost feature of PPA is its targeting 
precision. In the literatures of poverty alleviation, the con-
cept of targeted poverty alleviation is not new; however, 
“target” is usually used in the context of “geographical tar-
geting” or “group targeting (categorical targeting)” and 
rarely used at individual level. In contrast, PPA pulls tar-
geted poverty alleviation to its extreme by aiming at each 
and every poor at individual level and thus can be viewed 
as the most radical form of targeted poverty reduction. As a 
bodacious social experiment with blanket coverage in a 
huge country, is PPA superior or inferior to the previous 
versions of targeted poverty alleviation programs in theory 
or in practice? Why? 
Another outstanding characteristic of PPA is that it has 
a clear and precise deadline to eradicate extreme poverty in 
China thoroughly and completely. It is true that almost 
every poverty intervention program is related to a definite 
time frame. But, for such an ambitious program like PPA, 
five years are extremely short in comparison with, for ex-
ample, the first Millennium Development Goal of the UN, 
which aimed to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the propor-
tion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day. Con-
sidering the commitment is very high but the time is very 
limited, what is the prospect of this program? If this pro-
gram is bound to fail, what can be done to contain the pos-
sible social cost of the failure of this program? All these 
questions are worth our most serious studying. 
It is also interesting to compare PPA with the War on 
Poverty in the US launched half century ago. We notice that 
these two programs share a host of commonalities.  
▪ Both programs are targeted.  
▪ Both programs are high-profile. The State Council of 
China has set October 17 as the Poverty Alleviation Day of 
China and set up national poverty alleviation awards, in-
cluding progress award, contribution award, dedication 
award and innovation award, to honor poverty-relief mod-
els while increasing publicity to win public support. 
▪ Both programs are implemented in a campaign-like way. 
▪ Both programs take customized approach to poverty due 
to different causes.  
▪ Both programs aim to eradicate absolute poverty once for 
all in several years.  
▪ Both programs are sophisticatedly designed and have 
similar rationales behind them, as both intended to help 
the poor to help themselves, as the propaganda of the War 
on Poverty put it: “(provide) doors, not floors”.  
▪ Both programs take some labor-intensive measures at the 
community level in implementation, for instance, both 
dispatched professionals to go into communities to help the 
poor on an individual basis.  
▪ Both programs use the same rhetoric. In 1964, President 
Lyndon Johnson declared unconditional War on Poverty 
with a vision of a “Great Society”; in 2015, the State Council 
of China issued the Decision on Winning the Fight against 
Poverty in order to “finish building a moderately prosper-
ous society in all respects”. 
While we all know the ending of the War on Poverty is 
that the poverty won. Can we anticipate a different result of 
PPA? After all, PPA has its own special features as we have 
discussed above.  
3. Theoretical Flaws of the PPA 
The prerequisite of the PPA is that each and every im-
poverished individual can be identified (zero exclusion 
error) at reasonable cost and without including many non-
poor (low, possibly zero inclusion error; otherwise, it is not 
precise.). However, this prerequisite simply does not exist.  
While there is worldwide agreement on poverty reduc-
tion as an overriding goal of development policy, there is 
little agreement on the definition and measurement of pov-
erty. There are at least four different approaches to the 
definition and measurement of poverty - the monetary, 
capability, social exclusion and participatory approaches. 
These approaches have different theoretical underpinnings 
and involve various judgments. Different methods based on 
these approaches will point to different people as being 
poor for targeting. Empirical work in Peru and India shows 
that there is significant lack of overlap between the meth-
ods with, for example, nearly half the population identified 
as in poverty according to monetary poverty not in capabil-
ity poverty, and conversely. This conclusion is consistent 
with previous studies. Obviously, the definition of poverty 
matters a lot for poverty eradication strategies (Laderchi et 
al, 2003). In practice, much more definitions of poverty 
have been used. Aldi Hagenaars and Klass de Vos (1988) 
used eight different definitions of poverty to determine who 
is poor, using a 1983 Dutch sample of 12,000 households. 
They found that the percentages of poverty based on these 
various definitions varied widely, and the choice of poverty 
definition had far reaching effects on social policy. Lu 
(2012) used four approaches to poverty assessment, name-
ly, the Monetary Approach, the Participatory Poverty As-
sessment, the Multidimensional Poverty Indicators and 
China’s Official Poverty Identification method, to identify 
the poor from 473 households in rural Yunnan and found 
that the overlap and correlation coefficients between ap-
proaches was very low. 
Qizilbash (2003) distinguished between two types of 
vagueness concerning the definition and measurement of 
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describing the set of admissible dimensions and the latter 
describing the critical level in a particular dimension. 
Clarke and Hulme (2010) established time and in particu-
lar duration as the third analytical component besides 
depth (severity) and breadth (multidimensionality) for 
understanding poverty. They named this aspect the tem-
poral vagueness of the concept of poverty. 
The debates around the concept of poverty and the 
vagueness nature of the definition and measurement of 
poverty mean that the precision that has been boasted by 
PPA can never be reached. Any effort aiming to identify the 
poor precisely is bound to come to a regrettable failure. 
What makes things worse is that poverty as a concept is not 
only vague but also complex in terms of the requirements 
of its operationalisation. This complexity lies in the fact 
that poverty is a multi-dimensional and social phenomenon 
(Neff, 2013). Trying to reduce different aspects of poverty 
to money alone will lead to a big loss in our understanding 
of the nature of the concept. Besley and Kanbur (1991) pos-
ited that perfect targeting was unrealizable because of three 
factors: 
▪ The cost of administration and data collection. 
▪ Individual responses and incentive effects. 
▪ Considerations of political economy. 
The first factor is especially relevant to developing coun-
tries like China, where most required data are simply not 
available and the program administrators and potential 
benefits claimants are not experienced to acquire the very 
limited available data. The second factor can be a big con-
cern when the interests at stake are high. The potential 
claimants might well be motivated to manipulate the in-
formation they report in order to be eligible for the poverty 
alleviation programs, this is especially true when it is not 
easy to check the accuracy of the information. The political 
economy of a public policy in a socialist country like China 
reveals itself in a way different from that in a typical capi-
talist country. In China even when many people do not 
support a policy, chances are that this policy can still be 
approved by the government and get implemented as long 
as it is the will of the CPC. However, as is the case as any-
where else, if a policy is not supported by the majority of 
the people, the barriers will be huge in the process of its 
implementation. Fine targeting risks losing the support of 
the majority who are excluded from the benefits programs. 
PPA takes a monetary approach and sets the poverty 
line at 1.9 dollar (in 2011 PPP dollars) income per day per 
person. The central government of China ruled in 2015 that 
rural residents with an annual income of less than 2,800 
RMB 6 were living in absolute poverty. This artificial desig-
nation seems to have sidestepped the horizontal vagueness 
and vertical vagueness problem, but only superficially, 
since this ostensible solution will cause a series of troubles 
at later stages of implementation, which we will detail in 
next section. For now, it is suitable to add that, just as well-
                                                             
6  According to purchasing power parities (PPP) data published 
on the website of OECD, this is equal to 2.21 dollar in 2015. The 
PPP data can be accessed at 
https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-
ppp.htm. 
being is multifaceted, poverty is a multidimensional phe-
nomenon which is beyond the summarizing capacity of a 
single monetary indicator. Money-centric approach to the 
measurement of poverty is especially problematic when 
there is a market failure or the specific market for some 
goods or services simply does not exist. This happens to be 
the case in China when the pricing mechanisms in many 
markets are disputable and many public services such as 
quality education, hospital, or even clean water are simply 
not accessible in some remote rural areas. 
The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen made the following 
comments about pursuing precision in order to be precise. 
A formal expression can be extremely precise without 
being at all a precise representation of the underlying 
concept to be captured. In fact, if that underlying concept 
is ambiguous, then the demands for precise representation 
call for capturing that ambiguity rather than replacing it 
by some different idea – precise in form but imprecise in 
representing what is to be represented. (Sen 1989: 317) 
Moreover, the temporal vagueness of poverty can not be 
tackled as easily as in the case of horizontal and vertical 
vagueness by artificially designating some observation time 
points or periods. It is difficult to determine how often and 
for how long we must observe so that we can get enough 
data to distinguish the poor from the non-poor, and to dis-
tinguish the chronic poor from the transient poor. One may 
tend to think that transient poverty is not as serious as 
chronic poverty, but transient poverty can also cause irre-
versible effects on the physical stature and cognitive ability 
of people like chronic poverty, especially for those vulnera-
ble groups of people such as pregnant women or children. 
The real problem is that the identification of the transient 
poor is much more evasive than that of the chronic poor, 
since sporadic measurements are likely to fail to identify 
those transient poor, who happen to be non-poor at the 
moment or in the period when the measurement is taken. 
Clarke and Hulme (2010) made the following comments on 
the increasing use of panel data to examine whether pov-
erty is a transient or persistent experience. 
▪ To operationalise time they assume that a household that 
is poor at t1 and t2 has been poor for all of the intervening 
period: for many households this may be an invalid as-
sumption. 
▪ As both income and consumption are measures that can 
fluctuate greatly over short periods of time, studies based 
on these indicators are likely to make poverty appear to be 
a relatively transient experience. Measures based on a more 
holistic concept—literacy, nutritional status, housing quali-
ty—would produce a quite different picture.  
▪ The considerable measurement error associated with 
income and consumption, at both t1 and t2, amplifies the 
degree to which poverty appears to be a transient and sto-
chastic phenomena rather than a chronic and structural 
phenomena. 
Clarke and Hulme’s comments are highly relevant in 
China, since even panel data is a luxury which a poverty 
reduction practitioner can only dream of. Since the vast 
majority of the absolutely poor people in China live in the 
A Critique of Precision Poverty Alleviation: Does China Approach Adequate Policy Tools? 
 
 
15 © Business and Public Administration Studies, 2020,Vol. 13, No. 1 
rural areas7, where subsistence production is an important 
part of their income resources, evaluating their incomes 
requires imputing the values of their produces. This impu-
tation cannot be done precisely because the price of the 
produces fluctuate frequently, and a trivial error may be of 
vital importance to the person in question, given the fact 
that the task is about identifying the poorest among the 
poor. 
With all those problems discussed above, if we want to 
target the poor at individual level (to achieve perfect target-
ing) at all cost, is it doable? From an instrumental point of 
view, this is still impossible. In general, there are several 
different mechanisms we can use to target the poor, but 
none of them can ensure perfect targeting. A report (Deve-
reux et al, 2015) classifies and analyses targeting mecha-
nisms under six “pure” categories and one “hybrid” catego-
ry:  
1. Means testing (including unverified means-testing): 
based on an assessment of income, assets or wealth of ap-
plicants.  
2. Proxy means testing: based on a weighted combina-
tion of characteristics that are believed to be highly corre-
lated with wellbeing or deprivation. 
3. Categorical targeting: based on characteristics of in-
terest to policy-makers, which might or might not be corre-
lated with wellbeing or deprivation. 
4. Geographic targeting: based on location or residence 
(e.g. an area affected by a hazard, or a district with high 
poverty prevalence). 
5. Community-based targeting: based on an eligibility 
assessment performed by the community where a program 
is implemented.  
6. Self-targeting: based on voluntary participation or 
self-selection.  
7. Multiple mechanisms: where more than one mecha-
nism is used to identify program participants, either simul-
taneously, sequential or in parallel.  
Means testing is the most straightforward and most 
promising mechanism to target the poor precisely. Howev-
er, assessing and verifying income is virtually impossible, 
especially in developing countries where employment (es-
pecially that of the poor) is irregular, where there is a sub-
stantial part of the income comes in the form of subsistence 
production and where the definition of a household is 
problematic. Evaluating the assets or wealth owned by a 
household is possible to some precision but the cost can 
rise exponentially in order to be more precise.  
Proxy means testing is based on the correlation between 
observable and identifiable variables and poverty. Since 
correlation is based on statistics, it generally does not apply 
to individual analysis. As Rachel Sebates-Wheeler put it, 
“Even in cases in which a proxy, such as a disability or 
asset ownership, does correlate with income or consump-
tion poverty, the blueprint implementation of a social pro-
tection program for the identified population still does not 
account for heterogeneity within that population, and this 
                                                             
7  The urban poor have been eradicated officially by the introduc-
tion of Dibao in urban areas. 
shortcoming can strongly undermine the achievement of 
program objectives.” (Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, 2018) 
While categorical targeting and geographical targeting 
do not target the individual, community-based targeting 
and self-targeting focus mainly on the process rather than 
on the cutoff criterion of the targeting. Both mechanisms 
have their own drawbacks and can not achieve the preci-
sion that PPA requires. For example, in community-based 
targeting, the social aspects of the poverty often come to 
the fore. If somebody is unpopular in the community, she 
or he might be excluded from the list of candidates at first 
round discussion. Sometimes the community would rather 
to distribute the benefits of the targeting program equally 
to everyone in the community in some way. The rationale 
of self-targeting is the poor people behave differently from 
the non-poor in some aspects, and this behavioral differ-
ence can be used to recruit the real poor into the program 
while filtering out the non-poor. Generally speaking, a well-
designed self-targeting works, sometimes even satisfactori-
ly, but of course, it does not identify the poor precisely. 
Using multiple mechanisms in one program can enhance 
the precision of the targeting with higher administrative 
costs, but it can not achieve perfect targeting as well. As 
such, even the strongest supporters and advocates of tar-
geting recognize that its accuracy will never be perfect. Due 
to information gaps and insufficient data to define the 
poor, precise targeting cannot be achieved. Misreporting 
may also lead to exclusion and inclusion errors (Dutrey, 
2007). 
What is more, precise targeting by monetary measure is 
actually meaningless. Sen (1987) discusses the relations 
between various approaches of wellbeing which Muellbauer 
(1987) visually presents in the following graph (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Utility, functionings, capabilities and their 
sources 
Source: Muellbauer 1987.  
While the final determinant of poverty (or wellbeing) 
lies far on the left, i.e., the utility, the monetary factors are 
simply missing in the graph. The dotted lines are used to 
denote Sen’s preference for functionings and capabilities 
than utility as a measurement of wellbeing. Gunewardena 
(2004) explains that if one were to include income in that 
figure, it would be to the right of commodities, and a corre-
sponding box in the lower row would include prices (in-
come, together with prevailing prices, determine the 
amount of commodities that can be consumed). An ex-
panded graph based on Sen’s original idea and Gunewar-
dena’s explanation is given below (figure 2). This figure 
clearly explains the nature of poverty. 
 
Capabilities of a 
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Figure 2: The determinants of wellbeing   
 
Figure 2 systematically demonstrates the nature of pov-
erty. In Sen’s opinion (Sen, 1992), the relevant concept of 
poverty in income space has to be inadequacy (for generat-
ing minimally acceptable capabilities and functionings) 
rather than lowness (independently of characteristics). One 
can not measure inadequacy with a clear-cut poverty line 
which is designed to measure lowness. To be fair, although 
there are always debates about how to count the poor, such 
as the debate between Reddy, Pogge on one side against 
Ravallion on the other side (Anand et al, 2010), the intro-
duction of the poverty line is meaningful in that this crite-
rion helps us to count the poor in any given region in any 
given period. In some sense, the poverty line is more of 
macro economy indicator than micro economy indicator, 
where a large population can level off multiple fluctuations 
of various moderator variables in figure 2 to make it useful. 
Of course, even when the poverty line is used at macroeco-
nomic level to estimate global poverty, results may vary 
substantially (Anand et al, 2010, p 4). Of course, some dif-
ferences between different sources are tolerable for most 
purposes. However, each tool has its limitations. One obvi-
ous limitation of the poverty line is that it cannot be used to 
distinguish the poor on an individual basis. With a critical 
judgment like to be or not to be, errors are completely un-
acceptable for the involved subjects in the case of precise 
poverty alleviation. 
It is now almost a common sense that poverty is not 
equal to lack of money. In essence, lack of money is neither 
the basic feature nor the final cause of poverty. Instead, 
lack of money is only a frequently used proxy of poverty. 
The reason why monetary approach is the most popular 
approach in poverty studies is nothing but money is the 
most convenient (but not the most precise) measurement 
to study poverty. Since a constraint in income or consump-
tion by a given poverty line is only an imprecise proxy of 
poverty, it makes little sense to target poverty precisely 
defined by a monetary indicator. 
Because of the intrinsic vagueness and complexity of the 
concept of poverty, the effort to identify the poor precisely 
can result in nothing but false precision. Hence, the preci-
sion which characterizes PPA can be nothing more than a 
political rhetoric which cannot stand scientific examina-
tion. If precision is taken to be the overriding feature of 
China’s current poverty reduction policy, that policy must 
be ill-designed. 
What is more, even if a perfect targeting could be 
achieved, it is not desirable. In theory, there is a critical 
point of targeting precision beyond which targeting will 
result in the loss of efficiency. There is always a tradeoff 
between leakage (inclusion error) and undercoverage (ex-
clusion error) in poverty targeting. While estimates of op-
timal degree of targeting are rarely available, it seems that 
the optimal point should be closer to no targeting at all (a 
universalistic approach) than to a perfect targeting (degree 
of targeting=1).One rationale behind targeting is to give the 
poor more help with given resources by controlling the 
leakage to the non-poor. However, control of the leakage 
will inevitably leads to the rise of undercoverage, which is 
morally a big evil even less desirable than larger leakage, 
especially in the case of absolute poverty with very low 
poverty line. This is why a coarse targeting like geograph-
ical or categorical targeting is usually more desirable than a 
fine targeting based on means test not only economically 
but also morally. Some empirical evidences support this 
statement. Studies showed that, once administrative costs 
allowed for, relatively simple forms of targeting such as 
geographical targeting or categorical targeting dominate 
the alternatives in performance (Ravallion, 2007, Coady et 
al, 2004). Moreover, some poverty reduction measures are 
economically efficient only when they are taken at large 
scale. Remarkable economy of scale exists in many poverty 
reduction projects, for example, the improvement of infra-
structures like introduction or expansion of irrigation sys-
tems. The granularity of the use the poverty alleviation 
funds would crowd out the spending on large projects so 
that the economy of scale will suffer and the loss of effi-
ciency will result. 
Furthermore, the monetary approach of PPA does not 
serve the general purpose of building “a moderately pros-
perous society in all respects (MPSAR)” best. MPSAR is a 
concept bearing distinctive Chinese characteristics, which 
refers to a society with a stronger economy, greater democ-
racy, more advanced science and education, thriving cul-
ture, greater social harmony, and a better quality of life. 
Generally speaking, MPSAR is a Chinese version of human 
development ideal. Although MPSAR is somewhat different 
from some more popular human development ideals, it is 
also multidimensional and involving many aspects of mul-
tidimensional poverty. Xu (2009) set up the “Statistical 
Indicator System of Building a Moderately Prosper-
ous Society in all Aspects” also known as “System of 
Xiaokang (a Moderately Prosperous Society) Indica-
tions” to measure China’s progress and monitor the 
advancement of building a Moderately Prosperous 
Society. This system covers six areas including eco-
nomic development, social harmony, quality of life, 
democracy and law, culture and education, resources 
and environment with 23 indicators in total, among 
which indicators concerning health and education are 
highly relevant to poverty. It is strange that PPA concen-
trates only on the monetary aspect of poverty and fully 
ignores other aspects of poverty which are also parts of the 
indicator system of MPSAR. Precision in this manner is a 
waste of resources if not ridiculous.  
Finally, the globalization of poverty as a social phenom-
enon makes eradicating poverty in one country even more 
difficult. The success in eradicating extreme poverty within 
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only some countries is unstable at most. Extreme poverty 
can move across the borders through migration as well as 
industry relocation in the process of globalization. Eradi-
cating poverty first in a developing country like China once 
and for all is naïve both economically and politically. 
By the way, the timing of PPA is also dubious. One con-
sideration of targeted poverty alleviation is making more 
efficient use of limited poverty-fighting resources, but this 
is not the case of PPA. PPA was first proposed and got 
started in 2013. At that time, China’s economic growth is 
still very strong, and resources were not a big concern for 
the newly formed central government. In fact, the introduc-
tion of PPA is in parallel of a remarkable increase in the 
input of governmental poverty fighting resources. In 2016, 
the special funds for poverty alleviation allocated by the 
central and local governments exceeded 100 billion RMB 
for the first time, including 66.7 billion RMB from the cen-
tral government, an increase of 43.4% year on year and 
49.3 billion RBM from local governments, a year-on-year 
rise of 56.1%8 (Tan, 2018). It is quite obvious that the de-
sign of the policy prioritizes short-term effectiveness than 
long-term efficiency. What Xi wants is a quick-win, to end 
the absolute poverty in China with one single strike within 
his term as the leader of the Communist Party of China9 
(CPC). The new government needs a remarkable achieve-
ment to show its superb leadership art as well as its smooth 
governance mechanism. It is clear that the start point does 
not justify the choice of targeted poverty reduction pro-
gram to fight poverty, let alone the use of its most radical 
form. 
4. Conclusion 
China might not eradicate absolute poverty as defined 
by US$ 1.90 a day by 2020, but it could nonetheless declare 
a victory of PPA. It will state absolute poverty has been 
eradicated in China for the first time in its history and the 
victory is a glorious achievement in the history of mankind. 
The poor people left behind by PPA whose scale will be a 
secret would well be worse off, as many poverty reduction 
funds are withdrawn. The appearance of a large number of 
new precariat will be a new threat to the security of the 
society. 
As the finish of PPA comes near, it is too late to take any 
corrective measures to lead the program to a better result. 
However, it is advisable that China begin to devise some 
well-grounded strategies to handle the problems after PPA 
is finished, so that the social cost and unfavorable conse-
quences of the ill-designed policy could be minimized and 
the poor, the precariat and the society as a whole will suffer 
least. 
From a practical perspective, China should update its 
poverty line and initiate new poverty reduction programs 
as soon as the victory of PPA is declared rather than leaving 
a blank for poverty reduction initiatives. It is politically 
                                                             
8 According to the data from the Ministry of Finance of China, 
the central government has allocated over 106 billion RMB to 
subsidize poverty reduction in 2018, an increase of 20 billion 
RMB, or 23.2% over 2017. 
9  CPC is also known as CCP, the Chinese Communist Party. 
wiser to replace the old policy with new policy as soon as 
possible than debating over the goods and bads of the old 
program. It is hard for the politicians to admit their (not 
their forerunners’) blunders publicly, but they are likely to 
embrace a new initiative in the same field which is helpful 
to make up their unwise decisions in the past. As China is 
already an “upper-middle-income” country, it will face 
minimal obstacle to adopt a new poverty line at $5.50 (ex-
pressed in 2011 PPP U.S. dollars) a day set by the World 
Bank as additional poverty line for “upper-middle-income” 
countries in 2017. Fighting the poor with a threshold at 
$5.50 will surely pose a big challenge for China, while the 
poverty scale must be very large and the geographic distri-
bution of the poor will no longer concentrate in rural areas. 
Truly independent organizations should be formed in 
China to take some responsibilities in poverty reduction 
programs as soon as possible. Up to now the poverty reduc-
tion has been monopolized by CPC. Although some aca-
demic institutions, philanthropic foundations, brain banks 
take the form of NGOs or not-for-profit organizations, they 
all operate under the leadership of CPC. When the formula-
tion, implementation and evaluation of the strategies are 
all performed by one party, the real effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the strategies are hard to materialize. Nowadays, 
some grassroots independent organizations in the field of 
poverty reduction are emerging, but there is still a long way 
to go before these organizations can get legal status and 
adequate financial funds to prosper10.   
Structural reform should be initiated as an ultimate 
weapon to eradicate poverty. The inequality in China’s 
distribution system has long been a big issue. Without a 
structural reform in its distribution system, no poverty 
alleviation effort can eradicate poverty completely, as the 
distribution system will continue to produce poverty. Min-
sky (1965) pointed out that without tight full employment, 
any poverty fighting program can only redistribute poverty 
rather than eradicate it. However, over half a century after, 
it seems more and more difficult to create a full employ-
ment society. As such, a universal basic income proposal 
seems more realistic than the creation of full employment. 
As the economy slows down and the rise of AI would make 
many white-collar workers redundant, it might be a viable 
solution for China to introduce a universal basic income 
program as an updated version of Dibao11 that has been in 
place for many years in China. The targeting precision of 
Dibao is notorious partly because of corruption and bu-
reaucratic failings. Dibao fails to reach 71% of poor house-
holds, while 40% of recipients have incomes above the 
income threshold for eligibility (Ravallion 2007).A survey 
conducted by the World Bank and a study conducted by 
Ben Westmore of the OECD both found that the inclusion 
error and the exclusion error of dibao were could be terri-
                                                             
10 One of our authors is working to organize an independent asso-
ciation of academics who work in related fields of poverty re-
duction, which will be affiliated with Academics Stand Against 
Poverty (academicsstand.org) as an independent chapter. 
11  Dibao was first introduced in urban Shanghai in 1993, and by 
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bly high12 as 90% and 75% (The Economist, 29 Apr. 2017). 
Meanwhile, China’s spending in dibao in terms of a per-
centage of its GDP is a mere 0.2%, far below comparable 
programs elsewhere, for example, Indonesia’s 0.5%. If 
China takes a universalistic approach, all these flaws can be 
corrected.  
Desai (2015) infers that the last mile in poverty reduc-
tion is more likely to be achieved and sustained through 
universal social policies that garner broader political sup-
port by including the non-poor as beneficiaries. That is 
especially true in fragile states, where targeting may exac-
erbate social tensions, whereas universality can support the 
goals of nation building and social cohesion. 
From a theoretical perspective, the huge spending of 
PPA can and should become a valuable heritage for the 
international society to study from various disciplines such 
as poverty reduction, public policy, development econom-
ics, and political economy, among others.  
A more balanced way to evaluate poverty reduction pro-
gram need to be developed which may take the many trade-
offs in poverty-fighting into consideration, such as the 
trade-off between current welfare and vulnerability to vari-
ous risks in poverty intervention and the trade-off between 
under-coverage and leakage in targeting. In order to help 
the poor to escape poverty, financial institutions lend them 
money to encourage them to raise farm animals or plant 
cash crops. While these production activities offer the rural 
poor opportunities to earn extra money, they expose them 
to high risks simultaneously and make them more vulnera-
ble to adverse environments. Since it is immoral to encour-
age the poor to take risks, an indicator needs to be worked 
out to reflect risk-free return of an intervention. While 
there is no controversy that under-coverage and leakage 
should both be taken into consideration in evaluating a 
targeting program, how to integrate these two indicators 
into one is worth studying. Intuitively, the complex indica-
tor might be in the form of the product of the leakage rate 
and under-coverage rate to the power α (α>1). The ques-
tion to be answered is how large should α be? 
It would be extremely interesting to compare PPA with 
America’s War on Poverty in 1960s. Plenty of studies 
have been done on America’s War on Poverty since 
1960s. The same will happen to PPA in several years. For 
now, it is important to record genuine data in relation with 
PPA.    To conclude, PPA may not eradicate extreme pov-
erty entirely in China by 2020; and if extreme poverty can 
be eradicated in China one day, precise targeting may not 
be the most optimal approach or way to handle it as shown 
above. 
                                                             
12 The inclusion error and the exclusion error can both reach as 
high as 90% as recorded from 2007 to 2014 in different regions. 
Targeting (or, more precisely, mistargeting) with errors so high 
is worse than no targeting at all considering the administrative 
costs. 
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